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Abstract. We develop a model for 2 agents to reach agreement over
concept meaning in specific contexts. The model is based on an
argumentation-based communication that engage the agents in a pro-
cess of mutual adaptation using argumentation to reach an agreement
over concept meaning. Our approach is to model concept meaning using
the semiotic triangle and the notion of contrast sets. We implement and
evaluate present three common sense scenarios where two agents argue
and reach agreements over the contextual meaning of concepts.
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Introduction
Languages are a way to exchange information. However, those languages are used
in a particular perspective and follows particular rules that determines the mean-
ing of linguistic signs. If either the perspective or the rules are not completely
shared by two speakers it can lead to a disagreement over the meaning.
Our long term research goal is to develop a computational model of contex-
tual meaning agreement in a multiagent system (MAS) setting. Our assumption
is not only than meaning is context-dependent, but an agreement on meaning is
often negotiated among participating agents in a specific context. The approach
we take is that two agents, using argumentation-based communication, can detect
misunderstandings (disagreements), and engage in a process of mutual adapta-
tion, also using argumentation, to reach an agreement over meaning (with respect
of the concepts used in some context). In order to do so, we implemented agents
with contrast sets. A contrast set contains different segregates of the environment
[2], each of them linked to a particular sign. Each contrast set is associated to a
particular social context. To model the process of argumentation, we choose to
represent our signs as a part of a semiotic triangle [5] along with an intensional
and an extensional definition. Using the semiotic triangle with the argumenta-
tion theory [3] we show that it is possible to solve disagreements in several basic
scenarios, including synonyms and hyponyms, by creating new contrast sets.
The structure of this paper is as follows: we start by presenting the motivation
of our goals and the main background notions we use (semiotic triangle and
contrast set), then Section 2 presents our approach to reach those goals in a set
of limited scenarios, that are later explained in Section 3, where we also explain
the results of a prototype implementation. The closes with a discussion on the
current approach and future work on more generic scenario.
1. Motivation
Our approach to model contextual meaning is based on the notion of contrast
set developed in ethnographic studies of how people actually use (give meaning
to) words [2]. A contrast set is a collection of segregates, and a segregate is a
“terminologically distinguished array of objects”. For instance, a buyer can enter
an eatery and ask “What kind of sandwiches ya got besides hamburgers and hot
dogs?”, to which the seller responds “How about a ham ’n cheese sandwich?”.
Here the collection of words describing the different kinds of products one can eat
are the contrasts set: hamburgers, hot dog, ham ’n cheese sandwich, etc. However,
the way one person segregates and the word or sign used to reference them is
contextual, which can lead to misunderstandings that will require, to be resolved,
some adaptation of the intended meaning. An example of misunderstanding (from
[2]) is the client complaining with a sentence like this: “Hey, that’s no hamburger;
that’s a cheeseburger!”. The origin of the misunderstanding is that the client is
considering hamburger and cheeseburger as two different in the contrast set he is
using to conceptualize the eating options, while the common (or default) meaning
of cheeseburger is that it is a kind of hamburger.
The “meaning as usage” paradigm comes from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations, and is the underpinning of ethnographic notions like a contrast set
in a particular context or language game. We will approach this large problem in
a limited way, in scenarios where agents can negotiate an agree on meaning by
building new contrast sets in a new context.
As a running example of context-dependent meaning we will use the common
sense domain of Furniture Shopping. Let’s assume they have some default meaning
of some concepts (often called Ontologies in Artificial Intelligence), for instance
about furniture. If we ask the agents before they interact if an armchair is a
chair they would probably answer affirmatively. For our purposes, we can set that
armchair is a sub-concept of the chair concept. Now, imagine the buyer enters
the shop and tells the seller this: “I wan to buy one armchair and four chairs”. If
the seller understands the meaning intended by the buyer no misunderstanding
arises, and the will keep talking about “chairs” and referring to particular objects
in the shop that are “chairs” without any disagreement on any specific object.
And, nevertheless, they are not using “chair” as the same concept as before:
now the concept chair in fact means “chairs without arms”. This so because the
buyer has created the contrast set {armchair, chair}, and by doing so he has
(implicitly) decided to use the word “chair” with a new intended meaning. If the
two agents consistently use the term “chair” to refer only to objects in the shop
that are chairs and are not armchairs, we say they have achieved an agreement
on meaning. This “shift” in the meaning of a term or word is so pervasive that
we humans are hardly aware of it, but we would consider very wrong if the seller
tried to sell three armchairs and two chairs without arms (which is consistent
with the default meaning of chair and armchair).
Now, the issue we need to address is how to represent concept meaning in a
way that allows us to have a computational model in which this “shift” in the
meaning by creating contrast sets. The approach is semiotic, in which a concept
is represented by a semiotic triangle 〈S, I, E〉 with three components: a sign S,
a meaning (or intensional definition), and an object or reference (or extensional
definition) [5]. In this view, a sign like “chair” can have two different meanings in
the Furniture shopping scenario by being in two different semantic triangles. What
we called the default meaning is that often found in dictionaries and ontologies,
that specifies the typical or more frequent sense of a sign like “chair”, and could
be expressed in a semiotic triangle 〈“chair”, I, E〉 where I is the default meaning
of chairs (including armchairs and other sorts of chairs), and E is the objects
that can be referred to by that sign. However, after the buyer introduces the new
contrast set {armchair,chair}, the meaning of the sign “chair” needs to change. In
the Furniture Shopping scenario, the agreed meaning of that sign can be expressed
in a new semiotic triangle 〈“chair”, I ′, E′〉, where now the agreed meaning I ′ is
that of chairs without arms (because when referring to those the agents would
use the “armchair” sign); moreover, the set of objects that are reference of the
sign is also changed, since E′ is about objects that are chairs but not armchairs.
Specifically, our computational model will assume two agents with possibly
different contrast sets, and we assume that each term in a contrast set is a sign
S1 are represented as a semiotic triangle, in which the segregate corresponds to
extensional definition E1 of that triangle. Moreover, disagreements and negotia-
tion of an agreement over meaning will be performed by an argumentation-based
communication between two agents, explained in Section 2.
1.1. Related work
Ontology alignment has been studied on database schemas, XML schemas, tax-
onomies, formal languages, entity-relationship models, and dictionaries. Formally,
while matching is the process of finding relationships or correspondences between
entities of different ontologies, alignment is a set of correspondences between two
(or more) ontologies (by analogy with molecular sequence alignment, according
to [1]). Thus, the alignment is the output of the matching process.
There are two families of approaches to ontology alignment: (1) syntactic ap-
proaches establish matchings among predicates, terms or other structural prop-
erties of a formalism, essentially focusing on a notion of similarity; semantic ap-
proaches establish logical equivalence correspondences among ontology terms, es-
sentially focusing on a notion of semantic equivalence —in the logical sense of
“semantic”. We propose a third approach, a semiotic viewpoint that takes into
account both the extensional and intensional definitions of a concept. Moreover,
we have an agent-based approach: here each concept mapping is performed inside
each individual agent, not by a third party comparing two (external) ontologies.
Finally, we do not deal with files specifying a set of concepts (ontology), as is the
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Figure 1. A contrast set is a set of concepts that partition a domain of examples. To mutually
adapt their meaning of concepts, each agent can create a new contrast set (in addition the
old one) that allows it to reach an agreement over the meaning of a concept that arises a
disagreement in the old contrast set.
common approach, we deal with agents that argue and agree over concepts based
on how the concepts are used in a particular context. Indeed, the present work
expands the agent-based “concept convergence” approach in [3], where argumen-
tation and agreement among was not contextual and focused on a single, isolated
concept, not a contrast set.
2. Approach
In this section we will present with more details the general ideas introduced in
the previous part. Then, we will describe the argumentation protocol which allows
the mutual ineligibility between speakers (agents) in different scenarios where the
meaning is context dependent.
2.1. Concepts and Contrast Set
As we said, a concept Ci is understood as a semiotic triangle, i.e. composed of
a sign si, an intensional definition I(Ci) and an extensional definition E(Ci).
We use the notation Ci = 〈si, I(Ci), E(Ci)〉 to represent a concept Ci (Fig. 1).
E(Ci) is understood as the set of objects or examples known by the agent as
belonging to concept Ci. The intensional definition I(Ci) contains a set α1 . . . αm
of generalizations such that ∀e ∈ E(Ci),∃α ∈ I(C) : α v e and ∀α ∈ I(C),∃e ∈
E(Ci) : α v e. We will use the notation I(Ci) v e when there is a generalization
in the intensional definition that subsumes the example e, and to say that an
example belongs to the concept which sign is si we will also use the notation
si v e.
We introduced the notion of contrast set as a collection of concepts that in-
duces a partition on a domain; we will now define a contrast set in which concepts
are represented by the semiotic triangle with our terminology. A contrast set K
consists of a collection conceptsK = (C1, . . . Cn), with a collection of signs s(K) =
(s1, . . . , sm), a collection of intensional definitions I(K) = (I(Ci), . . . , I(Cm)),
and set of examples E(K) = E(C1) ∪ . . . ∪ E(Cm) belonging to those concepts.
Since a contrast set determines a partition of the elements in E(K), now each
intensional definition I(Ci) ∈ I(K) has to comply with the following property:
∀e ∈ E(K) \ E(Ci) : I(Ci) 6v e —i.e. the generalizations in I(Ci) shouldn’t sub-
sume an example also subsumed by a generalization from an intensional definition
of another concept in the contrast set.
To explore the notion of agreement over the meaning, we use a scenario with
two agents that have individual (and possibly different) contrast sets over the same
domain. The agents jointly observe new elements in this domain, and categorizing
elements in one of the concepts of their individual contrast sets. Disagreement
arises when the signs of the concepts in which an element is categorized are
different. Upon disagreement, the agents engage in an exchange of arguments
to adapt their individual contrast sets to one another until the disagreement is
solved. This is an iterative process in which both agents build two new contrast
sets that are closer: K1
adapt−−−→ K ′1  K ′2 adapt←−−− K2 (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2).
2.2. Communication Protocol
We assume that our agents already share the language L and are able to exchange
information trough a communication protocol that we will specify in the next
section using messages from the following list:
• Assert(s, e): this message asserts that the sending agent considers e to be
an example belonging to the same concept as the sign s (s v e).
• Accept(s, e): this message asserts that the sending agent agrees on fact that
e is in the concept whose sign is s (s v e).
• Refuse(s, e): this message asserts that the sending agent disagrees on fact
that e is in the concept whose sign is s (s 6v e).
• Ask(s, e): this message asks to the other agent which generalization, in the
concept whose sign is s, subsumes e.
• Answer(s, β, e): sends the generalization β, in the concept whose sign is s,
that subsumes e (β v e).
In order to explore the possibilities offered by the use of contrast sets, we
implemented three different scenarios that we present in the next part. We will
now present the protocol used by two agents to build and organize their contrast
sets in order to achieve a mutual agreement. A sketch of the protocol is as follows:
1. The two agents are waiting (Initial state)
2. An example ex is presented to the agents. Each agent Ai categorizes the
example with a sign si and sends Assert(si, ex) to the other agent.
3. Each agent verifies whether the received sign sj is in its contrast set. If
the sign is unknown the agent goes to step 5, otherwise they go to step 4.
4. Each agent verifies whether sj v ex in its individual contrast set:
• if it is true, the agent has no disagreement over the meaning of sj (si =
sj) and sends the message Accept(sj,ex). The the agent goes to step 1.
• if it is not true, the two agents are going to create new concepts in order
to reach an agreement over the contextual meaning of the sign used.
They go to step 5.
5. There is at least one agent which does not know one of the exchanged signs,
e.g. si, then this agent sends a message Ask(si, ex) to the other agent.
6. The other agent sends back an Answer(si, αm, ex) where αm is the gener-
alization that subsumes ex (αm v e).
7. The agent that did not know si uses the received generalization αm to
check if the unknown sign is a synonym or an hyponym of an already-
known concept I(Cj) (more details are given at the end of the scenario):
• in case of synonymy, the agent creates a new concept for the sign si.
• in case of hyponymy, it creates two new concepts; one for si (the un-
known sign) and one other for sj (the sign this agent sent when catego-
rizing ex).
• otherwise, the agent sends a Refuse(si, ex).
8. The agent incorporates those concepts:
• if no new contrast set has been created for the current social context
yet, the agent creates one and put the new concept(s) into it, while
including also the rest of the concepts from the first contrast set that
are not affected.
• if a contrast set has already been created, Ci is removed from it and the
new concept(s) is/are added.
9. The agent returns to 3 (although this time they will not disagree at 4).
We will now provide more details about the internal process occurring during
the step 7. When an agents receives the message Answer(si, αm, ex), it starts
by creating the set of examples E(C∗i ) that contains all the examples e
∗
i from
the extensional definition E(Kl) of its current contrast set Kl which verify the
property αm v e∗i . Then, ∀Cj ∈ Kl:
• if ∃Cj : E(Cj) = E(C∗i ), then the agent recognizes si as a synonym.
• if ∃Cj : E(Cj) ⊂ E(C∗i ), the agent recognizes si as an hyponym (Fig. 2).
In the case of a synonym, the new concept created is: Ca = 〈si, I(Cj), E(Cj)∪ex〉.
Since there is a synonymy, there is no need to change the extensional and inten-
sional definitions from the old concept Cj , except from adding the new example
ex to the extensional definition of course.
However, in the case of an hyponymy, the agent creates a second new ex-
tensional definition E(C∗∗j ) = E(Cj) − E(C∗i ). At this point, the agent has cre-
ated two new concepts, namely Ca = 〈sj , I(Ca), E(C∗∗j )〉 and Cb = 〈si, I(Cb) =
αm, E(C
∗
i )∪ex〉. After these two concepts are incorporated to the current contrast
set we still need to generate the intensional definition of the Ca concept. Now,
in order to create this intensional definition I(Ca), we use an argumentation-
based inductive learning method [4] that takes set of examples E(Kn) an positive
examples, and the rest of examples in the contrast set as negative examples.
3. Scenarios
We present three scenarios to test the agents’ ability to reach an agreement over
some concept meaning. The examples used during those scenarios are in part of
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Figure 2. When a new concept is needed, the agent asks the relevant generalization from the
other agent’s intentional definition of that concept; this generalization (e.g. α) leads to a split of
the previous extensional definition E4 in two: E5 (examples subsumed by α) and E′4 (the rest).
the common sense domain of seats. Specifically, examples of seats are divided in
three categories (Chairs, Armchairs and Stools), where we are using their typical
definitions: (1) a Stool has no back and no arms, (2) a Chair has a back but no
arms, and (3) an Armchair has a back and arms. In every scenario, agents A1 and
A2 start with their own individual contrast set. Given a new example ex, they
will try to solve their disagreement when it occurs.
3.1. Concept Hyponymy
In the first scenario the two agents have initially their contrast sets K1 and K2,
shown in Table 1. The first example e1 presented to both agents is an Armchair.
The two agents first send Assert(chair, e1) in the case of A1 and Assert(armchair,
e1) in the case of A2. They both discover a disagreement. The sign armchair /∈
S(K1) so A1 sends Ask(armchair , e1) to A2. A2 responds with Answer(armchair
β2) since β2 @ e1. Then, A1 creates the subset E(C6) = {ei ∈ E(C2)|β2 v ei}.
Since E(C6) 6= E(C2), A1 creates the subset E(C5) = E(C2)−E(C6). No contrast
set has been created yet, so A1 creates a new contrast set K
′
1. The new concepts
C5 = 〈chair , I(C5), E(C5)〉 and C6 = 〈armchair , β2, E(C6)∪ e1〉 are added to K ′1
with the concept C1. Then, A1 performs an induction on the new E(K
′
1) for the
sign chair that results to the generalization α3 which is added to I(C5). Finally,
A1 sends an Accept(armchair).
The second example presented, e2, is a Chair. The agents send to each other
Assert(chair, e2). Since both agents agree on the use of chair as a sign to describe
a Chair, they just send to each other two messages Accept(chair, e2).
The last example e3 presented to the agents is a Stool. As with e1, they both
notice the disagreement over stool and chair, but this time stool /∈ K2. It leads
A2 to send Ask(stool, e3) to A1. Since α1 @ e3, A1 sends back Answer(stool,
α1). Now it is A2’s turn to create a subset E(C7) = {ei ∈ E(C3)|α1 v ei},
Table 1. Initial contrast sets of agents A1 and A2
C. set Agent 1 contrast set K1
Concept C1 C2
Sign stool chair
I(C) α1: no.arm, no.back α2: with.back
C. set Agent 2 contrast set K2
Concept C3 C4
Sign chair armchair
I(C) β1: no.arm β2: with.arm, with.back
Table 2. Final contrast sets of A1 and A2
C. set Agent 1 contrast set K′1
Concept C1 C5 C6
Sign stool chair armchair
I(C) α1: no.arm, no.back α3: no.arm, with.back β2: with.arm, with.back
C. set Agent 2 contrast set K′2
Concept C7 C8 C4
Sign stool chair armchair
I(C) α1: no.arm, no.back β4: no.arm, with.back β2: with.arm, with.back
and since E(C7) 6= E(C3), A2 creates the subset E(C8) = E(C3) − E(C7). No
new contrast set has been created by A2, so it creates K
′
2. The new concepts
C7 = 〈stool , α1, E(C7) ∪ e3〉 and C8 = 〈chair , I(C8), E(C8)〉 are added to K ′2
with the concept C4. A2 performs an induction on the new E(K
′
2) for the sign
chair. The resulting generalization β4 is added to I(C8). Finally, A2 sends an
Accept(stool, e3) to A1. The contrast sets are now as shown in Table 2. We can
now see that K ′1 and K
′
2 are mutually intelligible.
3.2. Concept Synonymy
In the second scenario the two agents have initially their contrast sets K1 and
K2 are as shown in Table 3. The only example e1 presented to both agents is
an Armchair. A1 sends Assert(armchair, e1) to A2 and A2 sends Assert(recliner,
e1) to A1. It leads to a disagreement from both of A1 and A2. Since armchair
6∈ K2 and recliner 6∈ A1 neither, both agents can send an Ask message. Let’s say
that A1 receives the Ask message first; A1 will respond with Answer(armchair,
Table 3. A1 and A2 contrast sets
C. set Agent 1 contrast set K1
Concept C1 C2 C3
Sign stool chair armchair
I(C) α1: no.arm, no.back α2: no.arm, with.back α3: with.arm, with.back
C. set Agent 2 contrast set K2
Concept C4 C5 C6
Sign stool chair recliner
I(C) β1: no.arm, no.back β2: no.arm, with.back β3: with.arm, with.back
α3), where α3 is the generalization that was used by A1 to categorize e1. A2
creates a new set of examples E(C7) = {ei : ei ∈ E(C6)|α3 v ei}. No contrast set
has been created before so A2 creates K
′
2. Since E(C7) = E(C6), a new concept
C7 = 〈armchair, I(C6), E(C6) ∪ e1〉 is created and added to K ′2 along with C4
and C5. Accept(armchair,e1) is sent to A1 by A2. We notice that if A1 had been
faster than A2 to send its Ask message, it is recliner that would have been used
to designate an Armchair by both agents. This would not have affect the reach
of mutual intelligibility.
3.3. Concept Teaching
This time K1 is still as it was in Table 3 but K2 is modified as shown in Table
4. The first example e1 presented to the agents is a Stool. A1 sends Assert(stool,
e1) to A2 and A2 Assert(seat, e1) to A1. Since seat /∈ S(K1) and stool /∈ S(K2),
each agent can send an Ask message to the other. Let’s say that A1 is the fastest
to send its Ask(seat message, e1), A2 sends Answer(seat, e1).any @ α1, α2 and
α3: A1 sends Refuse(seat, e1) to A2. Now A2 sends Ask(stool, e1) to A1. A1
sends back Answer(stool, α1). Now A2 creates the subset E(C5) = {ei : ei ∈
E(C4)|α1 v ei}, and since E(C5) 6= E(C4), A2 also creates the subset E(C6) =
E(C4) \ E(C5). No contrast set has been created yet so A2 creates K ′2.The new
concepts C5 = 〈stool , α1, E(C5)∪e1〉 and C6 = 〈seat , I(C6), E(C6)〉 are added to
K ′2. New generalizations for seat, β3 = with.back and β4 = with.arm, are learned
by induction from E(K ′2) and added to I(C6).
The second example presented e2 is a Chair. A1 sends Assert(chair, e2) to
A2 and A2 Assert(seat, e2) to A1. Again, seat /∈ S(K1) and chair /∈ S(K ′2) so
each agent can send an Ask message to the other. Let’s say that this time A2
is faster and sends Ask(chair, e2) to A1. A1 sends back Answer(chair, α2) since
α2 @ e2. A2 creates a new set E(C7) = {∀ei : ei ∈ E(C6)|α2 v ei}, and since
E(C7) 6= E(C6), A2 also creates the subset E(C8) = E(C6) \ E(C7). The new
concepts C7 = 〈chair , α2, E(C7)∪e2〉 and C8 = 〈seat , I(C8), E(C8)〉 are added to
K ′2. The concept C6 is removed from K
′
2. A generalization for seat, β6, is learned
by induction from E(K ′2) and put into I(C8). A2 sends Accept(chair, e2) to A1.
The last example presented e3 is an Armchair. A1 sends Asset(armchair,
e3) to A2. Meanwhile A2 sends Assert(seat, 3) to A1. Since seat /∈ S(K1) and
armchair /∈ S(K ′2), both agents can send an Ask and let’s say that this time
again A2 is quicker and sends Ask(armchair, e3) to A2. Since α3 @ e3, A1 sends
Table 4. A2’s contrast sets before teaching
C. set Agent 2 contrast set K2
Concept C4
Sign seat
I(C) β1 : any
Table 5. A1 and A2 Contrast sets after the last concept learning
C. set Agent 2 contrast set K′2
Concept C5 C7 C9
Sign stool chair armchair
I(C) β2: no.arm, no.back α2: no.arm, with.back β6: with.arm, with.back
back Answer(armchair, α3). After receiving the answer, A2 creates a new set of
examples E(C9) = {∀ei : ei ∈ E(C8)|α3 v ei}. Since E(C9) = E(C8), a new
concept C9 = 〈armchair, I(C8), E(C8)∪ e3〉 is created and added to K ′2 while C8
is removed. An Accept(armchair,e3) is sent to A1. Table 5 shows the new K
′
2.
Discussion and Future Work
We have put together for the first time in a computational model the notions
of semiotic triangle and contrast sets, coming from very different fields of study,
namely semiotics and ethnographic studies. We have shown how these notions
can be given a computational model to represent concepts and the adaptation of
concept meaning in particular contexts. We have also shown that message pass-
ing communication among agents can be understood as arguments exchanged be-
tween the agents that trigger the necessary changes for adaptation. However, we
made certain assumptions to simplify the types of disagreement that may arise.
For this reason, the communication protocol only considers a limited number of
disagreements can arise, as shown in the “simple” scenarios presented. Neverthe-
less, the experiments show that a range of common scenarios in contextual mean-
ing adaptation are within the scope of the current approach (concept refinement,
synonymy detection).
There are three lines of future research that extend beyond the current as-
sumptions. The first one is that the two contrast sets may have overlapping ex-
tensional definitions of concepts, a situation we assumed did not happen in our
simple scenarios. This would allow a more complex argumentation model, where
counter-arguments and counter-examples of one agent can attack the arguments
of the other agent. A second line of research is having several levels of contrast
set with different granularities (i.e. a taxonomical terminology). The third line of
research is a recursive approach, in which specific predicates in L may also be
unknown or not agreed-upon, e.g. they disagree on what constitutes of not an arm
of seat, and then agents may initiate a new a dialogue to achieve an agreement
over meaning. After this agreement is reached, the agents can return to the higher
level dialogue.
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